Regulatory Constraints and Cost Efficiency of the Italian Public Transit Systems: An Exploratory Stochastic Frontier Model by Massimiliano Piacenza
Ceris-Cnr, W.P. N° 2/2002 
 
SERIE SPECIALE IN COLLABORAZIONE CON HERMES 
 
Regulatory Constraints and Cost Efficiency of the Italian Public 
Transit Systems: An Exploratory Stochastic Frontier Model ♣ 
Massimiliano Piacenza* 
(Ceris-CNR, HERMES ) 
 
 
February  2002 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The core of the present study is to analyse the cost efficiency of public transit systems in Italy, 
investigating the way subsidization mechanisms and network characteristics affect the x-inefficiency 
levels of firms. The analysis uses a seven-year (1993-1999) unbalanced panel of 45 Italian public-owned 
companies run under two different regulatory schemes (cost-plus or fixed-price). A stochastic cost 
frontier is estimated by applying the Battese and Coelli (1995) econometric model, which allows the 
inefficiency measures to depend on observable factors that are firm-specific and can vary over time. The 
results provide some insights regarding the appropriate mechanism of granting subsidies, and in turn they 
are useful for assessing the ongoing reform of the sector. The evidence indicates that there is scope for 
transport policy to increase cost efficiency. Efforts have to be intensified in the twofold direction of 
replacing cost-plus subsidization mechanisms with high-powered incentive schemes and improving 
exogenous operating conditions of the network. The latter goal could be pursued by acting on factors such 
as the road space allocation (exclusive lanes for trams and buses, parking and private traffic regulation), 
or the provision of incentives for the use of public modes. 
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1.
 
Introduction
During the first half of the nineties, many efforts were made in the attempt to
redress the ruined financial and economic situation characterizing the Italian local
public transit (LPT) industry. Nevertheless, these interventions were only stopgap
measures, that turned out to be inadequate to achieve the general goal of a structural
readjustment of accounts. A legislative reform started with Law
 
549/1995, which
introduced the financial responsibility for the Regions, and subsequently continued with
the Decreti Legislativi 422/1997 and 400/1999. These normative actions met the need of
a deep shake-up of the entire industry, that many experts indicated as the only way to
achieve a remarkable improvement in terms of productive efficiency and effectiveness
of the service.
The core of the present study is to put forward information on x-efficiency
(Leibenstein, 1966) of the Italian public transit systems, so as to highlight distortions
from the best-practice behavior of cost minimization. Moreover, in view of the
importance of regulatory constraints in the production analysis of public utilities, as
emphasized by recent empirical literature1, we investigate how subsidization
mechanisms affect firms’ efficiency levels. The results of this analysis, which includes
companies operating under two different regulatory schemes (cost-plus or fixed-price),
should provide some insights regarding the appropriate mechanism of granting
subsidies, and in turn they might be useful to assess the ongoing reform of the sector.
A seven-year unbalanced panel data of 45 Italian public-owned LPT companies is
used in the empirical analysis. In the light of purposes of this work, the observed time
period (1993-1999) is particularly informative, since it encompasses both years before
and after the start-up of the reform. The estimation of a stochastic cost frontier model is
carried out by applying the Battese and Coelli (1995) methodology, which assumes the
inefficiency terms to be a function of a set of explanatory variables including firm-
specific and time effects. In particular, the present investigation analyses how
regulation, network characteristics, and their interaction affect cost inefficiency.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly summarizes the
regulation of the Italian LPT industry in the last decade, focusing on the subsidization
schemes and the related incentive mechanisms. In Section 3, we develop the
econometric model. Section 3.1, in particular, specifies the stochastic cost frontier,
                                                
1 For the LPT industry, see Dalen & Gomez-Lobo (1997), Ivaldi (1997) and Gagnepain & Ivaldi
(1998).
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while Section 3.2 deals with the modeling of x-inefficiency effects. The database is
described in Section 4. Section 5 comments on the empirical results, discussing both the
technology properties (Section 5.1) and the evidence on cost inefficiency (Section 5.2).
Section 6 summarizes the major findings and provides some policy indications.
2.
 
Subsidization mechanisms and incentives
A common feature of the regulatory framework of public transit systems in most
countries is the provision for transfers from the local authority to the LPT firm. Since
the latter face universal service obligations, commercial revenues are generally not high
enough to cover operating costs. The payment of a subsidy is then required to ensure the
balance of the budget. In 1995 the share of public subsidies over operating costs for the
Italian bus-line companies amounted to about 71%. The LPT industry in Italy has been
interested by several important regulatory interventions during the last seven years, in
the effort to reduce the waste of public funds spent on collective transport.2 In 1995,
Law 549 implied the abolition of the old system of redressing deficits of LPT firms
through resources drawn on the National Transport Fund, a central government grant
system properly created for this purpose. The opportunity cost of public funds was
thereby transferred to the Regions, who are nowadays in charge of the programming of
services. Subsequently the Reform has been implemented by the Decreti Legislativi
422/1997 and 400/1999.
An important innovation that the legislator tried to introduce in the organization of
local public transport is the increase of the financial responsibility of all the subjects
operating in the sector, i.e., local authorities and LPT firms. The purpose is to better
select which public service deserves to receive subsidies3 and to stimulate the recovery
of productive efficiency by transportation companies. Here the necessity comes to
eliminate the transfers from the central government and to replace them with forms of
taxation at regional level, in order to make binding for local authorities any measure for
an efficient use of public resources. In parallel, the reform dictates that the relations
between the regulatory subject and the transit service provider are governed through the
so-called service contract, a formal agreement which defines the rules that the LPT
                                                
2 The Italian regulatory framework is analyzed in detail in Piacenza (2000b) and Boitani and Cambini
(2001a).
3 Decreto Legislativo 422/1997 names these categories “minimum services”. In practice, the definition
of minimum service should correspond to the level of service that a community wants to make
universally and actually affordable to each of its member, normally at non-market special tariff
conditions.
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company must obey as well as the reimbursement and risk sharing scheme between the
regulator and the operator4.
After the enactment of Law 549, subsidization practices began to develop
differently in Italy. Before 1996, all LPT systems were run under cost-plus regimes,
characterized by the full recovery of budget losses by local authorities5. According to
this scheme, known in the regulatory practice as management contract (European
Commission, 1998), the operator does not bear any risks on costs (industrial risk) and
revenue (commercial risk). Thus, in the light of the new theory of regulation (Laffont
and Tirole, 1993), it has no incentives to produce efficiently. From 1996 onwards, some
municipalities introduced alternative reimbursement mechanisms that, even if not
formalized within a proper service contract yet, virtually overcame the ex-post
balancing of accounts: the gross cost schemes, under which the industrial risk is entirely
borne by the operator while the commercial risk is borne by local authority, and the net
cost schemes, that provide for the assumption of both types of risk by the company.
These two types of contractual arrangements are traceable to what the theory of
incentives in regulation names fixed-price schemes. In both cases, the transfer from the
local authority is defined ex-ante, on the basis of expected operating costs (gross cost
approach) or expected operating deficits (net cost approach), and realized costs/deficits
that deviate from the fixed criteria will not influence the level of subsidies. Thus,
compared to companies under the traditional cost-plus regime, the operators facing
fixed-price mechanisms are assumed to confront high-powered incentives towards a
cost minimizing behavior.
It is worthwhile to underline that both cost-plus and fixed-price schemes are not
optimal rules in the sense specified by the new theory of regulation. According to this
approach, because of the presence of informational constraints, optimal mechanisms
must solve the trade-off between the efficiency incentives typical of fixed-price
schemes and the rent extracting properties of a cost-plus regulation6. The complex
problem of designing an optimal contract is out of the scope of our study7, since only
fixed-price or cost-plus schemes are practiced at the present time in the Italian LPT
industry. Given the above discussion on the two regulatory mechanisms, the present
paper is aimed at investigating if transit companies run under fixed-price regimes are
more cost efficient due to the fact that they face stronger incentives to increase
                                                
4 The contents of the service contract are define in detail by article 19 of Decreto Legislativo 422/1997.
5 An exception is represented by Bolzano ACT-VVB, already subjected to a standard-cost regime from
1989.
6 See Laffont and Tirole (1993) for a complete description of this problem.
7 In this regard, see Wunsch (1994), Dalen and Gomez-Lobo (1995, 1997) and Gagnepain and Ivaldi
(1999), and for an application to the Italian regulatory framework, Boitani and Cambini (2001b).
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managerial effort8. If it is so, then we may conclude that incentive theory and modern
regulatory economics are necessary components in the production analysis of regulated
utilities. On the policy side, this investigation allows to assess if the subsidization
schemes recently introduced in Italy are suitable in order to recover efficiency, which is
one of the goals pursued by the legislative reform.
3.
 
The econometric model
The frontier concept arises in the econometric practice when one considers that
theoretical production and cost functions represent the maximum and minimum values,
respectively, of an optimization problem. In this sense the notion of cost function may
be interpreted as a frontier relationship, i.e., a benchmark behavior, because it is
impossible for a firm to achieve costs lower than the minimum requirement, whereas
higher levels are often observed in the real world, which reveal the presence of x-
inefficiency in the production process.
In the case of unbalanced panel data the general stochastic frontier specification
for a variable cost function can be written as:
},exp{);,,,( ftftftftftft ZPYVCVC ψβτ=  [1]
with  ftftft uv +=ψ , [2]
where VC denotes variable cost, Y
 
represents a vector of output, P is an m × 1 vector of
prices of variable factors, Z is an n × 1 vector of variables including quasi-fixed inputs
and network characteristics, τ indicates the year of the observation involved,  and β is a
k × 1 vector of technology parameters to be estimated. For all variables the subscript f
indexes firm ( f = 1, …, F ), and t indexes observation (t = 1, …, Tf ). The f subscript on T
is used to indicate the unbalanced nature of the panel. For all f 1 ≤ Tf ≤ T, with T
denoting the maximum number of observations available for a firm9.
As usually in the frontier literature, the error term ψft is decomposed into two
components: (i) the white noise component, vft, which capture the effects of all
exogenous shocks to the production process and (ii) the inefficiency term, uft,
representing firm- and time-specific cost inefficiency. The statistical noise term, vft,
makes the frontier cost function VC(.) stochastic and can take both positive and negative
                                                
8 A preliminary analysis in this direction, based on average cost and productivity indicators, is provided
in Fraquelli et al. (2001a).
9 Although it is assumed that there are T time periods for which observations are available for at least
one of the F firms involved, it is not necessary that all the firms are observed for all T periods in an
unbalanced panel data specification of the econometric model.
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values, according to whether the exogenous shocks have unfavorable or favorable
effects on cost. The non-negative error component, uft, on the other hand, indicates the
amount by which the logarithm of cost of the    f th firm at the tth observation exceeds the
logarithm of stochastic frontier, ln VC(.) + vft, due to x-inefficiency. When uft = 0 for a
particular firm, f, at observation t, it attains the cost frontier.
3.1. Specification of the stochastic frontier cost function
To analyze the productive structure of the Italian LPT industry we chose a
variable operating cost model. The fixed assets investments in this sector are strictly
related to government financing programs, so it is not proper to suppose that companies
exhibit a cost-minimizing behavior with respect to capital too. Therefore, as Windle
(1988), Levaggi (1994) and Fabbri (1998) suggest, the rolling stock should be
considered as a fixed factor in the short-run. The model includes: a scalar output )(Y ;
the prices of three variable factors, i.e. labor (L), fuel (F ), materials and services (MS); a
quasi-fixed input )(K ; a network characteristics (SP), i.e. the average commercial
speed; a time trend variable (τ
   
).
We use a composite measure of the output to reflect the global productive
structure of firms. It is well-known in transportation literature that the output definition
is a much debated question, since it can lead to different results, for example in terms of
scale economies. The output indicator is computed by multiplying the transit firm’s fleet
size, measured in terms of total places offered10, and the total traveled kilometers. We
want to point out some remarks about this kind of output. If we consider the operative
context of the LPT industry, a firm must supply the service on a certain number of lines,
offering a certain number of places and trips on this network. Our definition of output
allows us to take into account the length of the network, the frequency of the service
and the size of the fleet. Furthermore, this measure is particularly suitable to our specific
firm sample, which includes both urban and extra-urban services. As it was not possible
to separate the urban activity from the extra-urban one, we defined an aggregate output
and aimed to weight their specific characteristics11.
                                                
10 The total places offered were calculated by multiplying the number of vehicles owned by each unit
and their average load capacity.
11 Generally speaking, the extra-urban firms can perform a higher number of kilometers than the urban
units, covering a larger network, but the operative context is very different (a lower number of
passengers, longer trips, different traffic conditions). On the other hand, a urban company reasonably
offers a higher number of places (buses are larger and also their number is higher, because there is a
more intensive demand to satisfy).
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The capital stock plays the role of quasi-fixed input in our variable cost model. It
is represented by the number of vehicles owned by LPT companies weighted by the
average fleet age. We calculated the indicator as follows: Kft = (number of vehicles in
the rolling stock)*(ages / ageft), where ages is the average fleet age in the whole analyzed
sample, while ageft is the average fleet age of firm f at the observation t.
Prices of variable factors were computed getting information from the balance-
sheet statistics. The labor price (PL) was obtained by dividing total labor costs by the
average annual number of service workers (drivers, maintenance workers and
administrative staff). The average price of fuel (PF) was obtained by dividing fuel costs
by the annual number of liters consumed12. Expenses for materials and services
represent a residual cost category. It has been divided by the annual seat-kilometers
offered to obtain an average price for this input (PMS)13. Indeed, it is reasonable to
assume that this kind of expense strictly depends on the actual exploitation of the
network.
In addition to the standard variables of a proper cost function, we included in the
model the average commercial speed of LPT vehicles (SP), already considered in some
works on the industry (for instance, Windle, 1988; Levaggi, 1994; Wunsch, 1996;
Gagnepain, 1998). The specificity of the territorial area where the service is provided
makes it difficult to compare the cost performance of different firms. Indeed, the traffic
conditions and the geographical characteristics are peculiar to each network. To some
extent, the average commercial speed should reflect differences in these environmental
factors. Incorporating the variable into the cost frontier, costs are expected to lower with
increasing network speed.
We added to the model a time trend too, measured in years, so as to account for
possible effects of Hicks neutral technological change. In fact, given the seven-year
length of the panel the impact of scientific or organizational progress should not be
negligible. Other things unchanged, costs are then expected to diminish over time.
A translog functional form is chosen for this analysis14. The stochastic frontier
cost model [1]-[2] is then defined by equation [3]:
                                                
12 For a few firms which utilize tramways, trolley-lines or railways and consume electricity, kilowatt-
hours were transformed in equivalent-liters.
13 Seat-kilometers are the multiplication of traveled kilometers by the average load capacity of vehicles.
14 Given the regularity conditions ensuring duality, the estimation of a translog cost function does not
impose any other a priori restriction on the characteristics of the below technology. In particular, the
elasticity of substitution and the returns to scale can vary with both the output level and the
combination of inputs. This fully satisfies the criterion of model generality.
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where the normalization of the monetary variables, VC, PL and PMS, with respect to the
price of fuel, PF, is made to ensure the linear homogeneity of the cost function in input
prices15.
The x-inefficiency term, uft, reflects the inability of firm f at the observation t to
attain the potential minimum cost defined by the stochastic frontier. The specification
for this effect and the discussion of the estimation technique for the final stochastic
frontier model are given in the next two sections.
3.2. Modeling inefficiency effects
Several innovations concerning the estimation of inefficiency using the stochastic
production and cost frontier approach have been introduced since the pioneer
contributions of Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt (1977) and Meeusen and van den Broeck
(1977)16.
Researchers have attempted to overcome the shortcomings present in the above
frontier models: by specifying distributional forms for the inefficiency effects more
general than the half-normal and exponential distributions (Stevenson, 1980; Greene,
1990)17; proposing functional forms alternative to the traditional Cobb-Douglas
                                                
15 Symmetry property (βij = βji for all i, j) is also imposed a priori, whereas the other regularity
conditions, viz., monotonicity of the cost function in input prices and output, and concavity in input
prices are checked ex-post.
16 A brief introduction to the literature on stochastic frontier modeling and efficiency measurement is
provided in Piacenza (2000a). For a recent and more detailed review see Kumbhakar and Lovell
(2000).
17 A common criticism of the stochastic frontier method is that there is no a priori justification for the
selection of any particular distributional form for the inefficiency effects, uft. The half-normal and the
exponential distributions are arbitrary selections. Since both of these distributions have a mode at
zero, it implies that there is the highest probability that the inefficiency effects are in the neighborhood
of zero. This, in turn, implies relatively high efficiency. In practice, it may be possible to have a few
very efficient firms, but a lot of quite inefficient firms.
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technology (e.g., Greene, 1980b; Kumbhakar, Ghosh and McGuckin, 1991)18; extending
the analysis to the dual cost function (e.g., Schmidt and Lovell, 1979; Ferrier and
Lovell, 1990; Kumbhakar, 1991)19; accommodating panel data (e.g., Battese and Coelli,
1988; Cornwell, Schmidt and Sickles, 1990; Kumbhakar, 1990; Battese and Coelli,
1992; Lee and Schmidt, 1993)20.
More importantly for the purpose of this work, a number of later empirical studies
(e.g., Pitt and lee, 1981; Kalirajan, 1981; Kalirajan and Shand, 1989; Mester, 1997)
have investigated the determinants of productive inefficiencies among firms in an
industry by regressing the predicted inefficiency effects, obtained from an estimated
stochastic frontier, upon a vector of firm-specific factors, such as the degree of
competitive pressure, input and output quality indicators, various managerial
characteristics, etc., in a second-stage analysis.  There is, however, a significant problem
with this two-stage approach. In the first stage, the inefficiency effects are assumed to
be independently and identically distributed in order to use the approach of Jondrow et
al. (1982) to predict the values of the technical inefficiency effects. However, in the
second stage, the predicted inefficiency effects are assumed to be a function of a
number of firm-specific factors, which implies that they are not identically distributed,
unless all the coefficients of the factors are simultaneously equal to zero.
Kumbhakar, Ghosh and McGuckin (1991) and Reifschneider and Stevenson
(1991) noted the above inconsistency and specified stochastic frontier models in which
the inefficiency effects were defined as explicit functions of some firm-specific factors,
and all parameters were estimated in a single-stage maximum likelihood (ML)
procedure. Huang and Liu (1994) also presented a model for a stochastic frontier
                                                
18 The Cobb-Douglas functional form has been commonly used in the empirical estimation of frontier
models. Its simplicity is a very attractive feature. This simplicity, however, is associated with a
number of restrictive properties. The Cobb-Douglas technology exhibit the same value of returns to
scale for all firms in the sample. Further, the elasticities of substitution between productive factors are
equal to one.
19 The cost frontier approach appears to be a significant improvement to the efficiency analysis. It
accounts for the possibility of exogenous output and endogenous inputs, permits the measurement of
technical and allocative inefficiency, and can be easily extended to account for multiple outputs.
Further, the objective of (total or variable) cost minimisation may often be a proper assumption. It is
particularly suitable in environments where output is demand driven, and so also can be considered to
be exogenous. Many regulated industries, such as electricity generation, gas distribution, or public
transit service, satisfy these exogeneity criteria. Moreover, in many industries output is not storable,
and so the output maximization objective that underlies the estimation of output-oriented technical
efficiency would be inappropriate.
20 Panel data have some advantages over cross-sectional data in the estimation of stochastic frontier
models. First, when panel data are available there is no need to specify a particular distribution for the
inefficiency effects, because the parameters of the model can be estimated using the traditional panel
data techniques of fixed-effects (dummy variables) or random-effects. Second, also by proceeding
with the more commonly used maximum likelihood (ML) methods, the availability of panel data
generally implies that there are a larger number of degrees of freedom for the estimation of
parameters. Third, panel data permit the investigation of efficiency change over time.
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production function, in which the non-negative technical inefficiency effects were a
linear function of variables involving firm characteristics, together with their
interactions with the input variables of the frontier function21. Battese and Coelli (1993,
1995) extended these approaches model to accommodate panel data, which permits to
include both firm-specific and time effects in the model adopted to explain
inefficiencies.
Coelli (1996) wrote a computer program, FRONTIER Version 4.1, that automates
the ML method for estimation of the parameters of Battese and Coelli (1995) model and
also allows to specify the stochastic frontier in terms of a dual cost relationship instead
of a production function. The availability of such a program, which permits to easily
estimate a stochastic cost frontier and analyze the sources of x-inefficiency, further
allowing unbalanced panel data (as the sample we have at hand), induced us to apply the
Battese and Coelli (1995) model for studying the effects of regulatory constraints on the
cost efficiency of public transit systems in Italy22. The objective, in particular, is to
investigate whether the predictions from the theory of incentives in regulation (Laffont
and Tirole, 1993) help explain differences in productive efficiency, i.e. do high powered
incentive regulatory schemes increase efficiency as compared to low powered schemes?
To do this, we start from issues of a stochastic cost frontier model recently developed
by Gagnepain and Ivaldi (1998)23.
                                                
21 This makes their model a non-neutral shift of the traditional average response function, in that the
marginal products of inputs and marginal rates of technical substitution (MRTS) depend on the firm-
specific variables in the inefficiency model.
22 A ML systems estimator, involving the cost frontier and the factor-share equations, would provide
more efficient estimators of the parameters of a cost function than the single-equation estimator
automated in FRONTIER. This system approach also has the advantage of explicitly accounting for
allocative inefficiency (reflected in the error terms of the factor-share equations), that represent
violations of the first-order conditions for cost minimization. However, a frontier systems estimator
suffers from some problems. First, it is not as yet automated in any computer package, hence one
would need to write code for it in some way (using SAS, GAUSS or TSP) that is often very time-
consuming. Second, once one specifies flexible functional forms, such as the translog form, where the
implied production function cannot be derived, the decomposition of the overall cost efficiency into
technical and allocative components (what has come to be known as “the Greene problem”) requires
some restrictive assumptions, and none of the existing approaches (e.g., Ferrier and Lovell, 1990;
Kumbhakar, 1991; Mensah, 1994;  Kumbhakar, 1997) is exempt from criticism from some quarter.
Further, estimation problems often arise when one tries to numerically solve the rather complicated
likelihood functions that are involved.
23 These authors directly incorporate into the cost minimization problem the distortions on productive
activity due to regulatory constraints and the presence of informational asymmetries in the regulator-
firm interaction. In this way, the error component the literature generally attributes to cost
inefficiency, uft, is already built-in and the econometric frontier model exactly coincides with the
theoretical cost model, without the necessity of adding other more than a random disturbance term to
account for exogenous shocks and potential measurement faults. In this work we do not utilize the
economic-theory-based methodology employed by Gagnepain and Ivaldi (1998). However, the
present study constitutes a useful exploratory analysis that could provide insights about the impact on
cost efficiency of the investigated variables. Thus, it represents the starting base for future more
elaborated works.
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We postpone to the following section the discussion concerning statistical
properties of the Battese and Coelli (1995) model and the estimation procedure. In
succession, the principal features of the Gagnepain and Ivaldi (1998) model are briefly
resumed, focusing the attention on the role of informational asymmetries and incentives
in the regulator-firm relationship. We describe then the variables we suppose to capture
these effects within the methodological framework proposed by Battese and Coelli.
From equations [1]-[2] overall cost inefficiency could be defined by the
expression exp{uft}, which represents the extent to which observed cost, VCft, exceeds
the frontier minimum level after accounting for the effect of statistical noise, VC(Yft, Pft,
Zft, τft; β)exp{vft}. Gagnepain and Ivaldi specified uft as g(θft, eft), so that exp{uft} =
exp{g(θft, eft)}, where g is a function strictly increasing in θ and decreasing in e24, θ is a
parameter reflecting the presence of exogenous technical inefficiency, source of a fall in
the productivity of labor input25, and e, that could be thought as more responsible for
allocative inefficiency26, represents the cost reducing activity exerted by managers to
counterbalance the effect of the intrinsic lack of labor productivity27.
The intrinsic inefficiency level, θ, is supposed to be perfectly known by the firm
and not known or imperfectly known by the regulatory authority (adverse selection
phenomenon), as the latter does not take part in the production process. On the other
hand, it should be even harder for the regulator-principal to observe and directly control
the effort provided by the manager-agent, e (moral hazard phenomenon)28. Since there
are no clear evidences on the motivation of a manager to work as hard as he could, it is
where the type of regulatory scheme and related incentives faced by the firm during the
production process play a role in reducing overall cost inefficiency, exp{g(θ, e)}.
The authors elaborated a structural cost frontier model, in which the cost reducing
effort of the producer is endogenous in the sense that it depends on the regulatory
environment impinging on its activity. By applying their model to the analysis of public
transit systems in France (Gagnepain and Ivaldi, 1998 and 1999) they showed that
operators subjected to fixed-price subsidization schemes exhibited higher effort levels
compared to ones displayed by companies run under cost-plus mechanisms29. Given the
                                                
24 Subscripts, f and t, are omitted for convenience in the presentation.
25 This type of inefficiency is given and cannot be changed by the management in the short run. It
depends on factors such as geographical and historical characteristics of a network, the structure of the
labor force or the ability level of drivers.
26 That is, the failure (attributable to an insufficient managerial effort) in making the actual MRTS
between any two inputs equal to the corresponding input price ratio.
27 The operator may spend time and effort in monitoring workers, for instance providing drivers with
training programs, solving potential conflicts among them, avoiding strikes, etc.
28 Indeed, the regulator cannot distinguish between the effect of intrinsic inefficiency and the impact of
cost reducing effort.
29 This evidence is clearly consistent with the new theory of regulation (Laffont and Tirole, 1993) which
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level of intrinsic inefficiency, this implied lower cost distortions over the best-practice
frontier, and the fact that fixed-price contracts provide more incentive for efficiency has
been proved. Only for a group of operators characterized by a fairly high technical
inefficiency, contractual arrangements did not appear to be very relevant for the firm’s
productive performance. Indeed, in these cases the cost reducing activity exerted by
managers had a little weight in determining global cost inefficiency. Consequently, the
distortions over the frontier remained significant also in presence of high powered
incentive schemes.
Taking cue from the above results, the Battese and Coelli (1995) stochastic
frontier model is applied to the analysis of overall cost inefficiency, or x-inefficiency, of
public transit systems in Italy. The emphasis is put on the role played by the regulatory
context, in terms of the different subsidization mechanisms that companies has to face,
taking also into account the specific characteristics of each network in a way which will
be specified later.
Battese and Coelli define the inefficiency effects, uft, as non-negative random
variables assumed to be a function of a set of firm-specific explanatory variables which
may vary over time, zft, and an unknown vector of coefficients, δ, associated with the
zfts. The explanatory variables in the inefficiency model would be expected to include
any factors that help explain the extent to which the variable cost observations exceed
the corresponding stochastic frontier cost values, VC(Yft, Pft, Zft, τft; β)exp{vft}. The zft-
vectors usually have the first element equal to one30 and may also include some
variables involved in the cost function31 and/or interactions between these latter and
firm-specific factors.
The x-inefficiency effect, uft, incorporated in the composed error term, ψft, of the
general stochastic frontier model [1]-[2] could be specified by equation [4],
uft = δ’zft + wft = ∑ +
q
ftqftq wzδ , [4]
where the q subscript on δ and zft indexes explanatory variables (q = 0, …, Q), and wft is
a random variable making the inefficiency effect stochastic whose distribution will be
defined in the next section.
                                                                                                                                              
defines the fixed-price schemes as the maximal powered incentive contracts. More precisely, the
optimal effort level equalizes the marginal disutility of effort and the marginal cost savings under
fixed-price regimes while it is nil under cost-plus regimes.
30 Not including an intercept parameter, δ0, in the zft -vectors may result in the estimators for the δ -
parameters being biased and the shape of the distributions of the inefficiency effects, uft, being
unnecessarily restricted.
31 Provided the inefficiency effects are stochastic.
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Since our objective is to verify if the causes of cost inefficiency affecting the
Italian public transit systems should be searched in the system of incentives generated
by the regulatory environment, we first introduce a regulation dummy, Rft, as
determinant of uft.
As mentioned before two great categories of reimbursement rules are observed in
practice: cost-plus schemes, according to which subsidies are paid by the local authority
to the company so to allow ex-post budgets to be balanced32, and fixed-price schemes,
where the transit operator obtains a transfer defined ex-ante in order to finance an
expected operating deficit33. Variable Rft takes value 0 when cost-plus regulation is
observed, and value 1 in cases where fixed-price schemes are applied. According to the
predictions from the theory of incentives in regulation and the evidence emerged in the
study of Gagnepain and Ivaldi, cost distortions over the frontier, exp{uft}, are expected
to be significantly lower under fixed-price regulation, as in such a context the
company’s manager should increase the effort to reduce production costs. The sign of
the parameter associated with the regulation dummy, δR, is then expected to be negative.
The second important explanatory variable we include in the specification of the
cost inefficiency model [4] aims at capturing the effects on x-efficiency attributable to
the specific operating conditions of the environment where the transit service is
provided. We refer to factors as the geographical and historical characteristics
influencing the structure and the operability of the network, the ability level of drivers,
the public policy for local mobility, etc. These are the elements that in the Gagnepain
and Ivaldi model contribute to determine the intrinsic labor inefficiency level, θft, what
the authors call “exogenous technical inefficiency”.
Here we do not obtain a specific estimate for this unobservable component of the
global cost inefficiency34. Still an attempt is made to include in the inefficiency model
[4] a variable strictly related to the above factors (from now on “network
characteristics”), likely to influence the exogenous technical inefficiency and then the
level of overall cost distortion. To this end we introduce as a proxy for network
                                                
32 In Section 2 we refer to this reimbursement rule as the “management contract”, under which the
regulated firm does not bear any risk.
33 This type of reimbursement rule specifically refers to the subsidization scheme we have called before
“net cost contract”. Actually, we have seen that the class of fixed-price schemes also includes the
“gross cost contract”. Under this variant, the authority receives the commercial revenue and pays the
firm’s expected costs. In terms of incentives to produce efficiently, it is similar to the first variant of
fixed-price contracts. Under the “net cost contract” option, however, the LPT operator bear all the
risks on costs (industrial risk) and revenue (commercial risk), whereas under the “gross cost contract”
option only the industrial risk is borne by the transit firm.
34 Indeed, we remark that θ represents an adverse selection parameter which reflects a private
information on the firm’s technology not known (or imperfectly known) by the regulatory authority
and the econometricians.
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characteristics the average commercial speed, ln SPft, already included in the
specification of the frontier cost function as a network variable affecting the underlying
technology35. Since a higher value for this variable is supposed to reflect better
operating conditions36, thus reducing the intrinsic inefficiency level, once the positive
relationship between θft and uft conjectured in the Gagnepain and Ivaldi model is
assumed to be valid, we expect to find a negative sign for the coefficient associated with
ln SPft, δSP, in model [4].
Furthermore, to take into account the evidence that when the intrinsic inefficiency
of a network is too high, the effect of contractual arrangements on the overall cost
inefficiency becomes modest37, the impact exerted by regulatory schemes is allowed to
vary with the level of average commercial speed. This is made by introducing in the
model an interaction of the regulation dummy with the variable ln SPft, denoted (Rft ×ln
SPft). The relative parameter, δRSP, is expected to have a negative sign, to indicate a
stronger power of fixed-price schemes in reducing x-inefficiency when regulated firms
are facing more favourable exogenous operating conditions. At the same time, the
negative sign of δRSP would means that the impact on cost efficiency due to a gain in the
average commercial speed is strengthened in presence of fixed-price schemes, because
of the higher cost reducing effort provided by managers under this type of regulation.
As the Battese e Coelli model enables us to include both firm-specific and time
effects in the specification of the inefficiency model, we also incorporate in the equation
[4] a time variable, τft, indicating the year of the observation involved. It specifies that
x-inefficiency may change linearly with respect to time according to the sign of the
associated parameter, δτ. Given the frequent government stopgap measures adopted in
the first half of the nineties to face deficits of LPT companies and the delays in bringing
about the reform started with the Law n. 549 in 1995, the sign of this coefficient is
expected to be positive. Moreover, an interaction between regulation dummy and time
variable is also introduced, so to allow the dynamics of cost inefficiencies throughout
the analyzed period to vary with the regulatory pattern.  We denote this variable with
(Rft ×τft), while δRτ is the relative parameter.
Under the above specifications on the set of explanatory variables, the zft s, the
cost inefficiency model [4] can be written as:
                                                
35 Transformation in logarithms is maintained for homogeneity with the equation [3]. In both cases the
logarithm specification allows to interpret the partial derivatives of the dependent variables, lnVCft and
uft, computed with respect to ln SPft in terms of elasticities.
36 In fact, it is reasonable to assume that the average commercial speed may increase for instance when
transit firms face more favorable geographical conditions, skilful drivers, or public policies attentive
to the local traffic regulation.
37 See the discussion above concerning the results obtained by Gagnepain and Ivaldi (1998, 1999) in
their study on the French public transit systems.
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ftftftRftftRSPftftSPftRft wRSPRSPRu +×+×++++= )()ln(ln0 τδδτδδδδ ττ . [5]
Equation [5] indicates that stochastic x-inefficiency effects are assumed to be
present in the frontier cost model defined by expression [3] and be linearly related to
regulatory scheme and commercial speed of the transit companies, the period of
observation, and the interactions of speed and time with regulation, such that an
intercept parameter, δ0, is included.
3.3. Distributional assumptions and estimation procedure
The final stochastic frontier model to be estimated is specified in equation [3],
where the cost inefficiency effects, uft, are defined by expression [5]. According to
Battese and Coelli (1995), the following distributional assumptions are made for the two
components of the global error term, ψft :
(i)
 
the random noises vft s are assumed ∼ i.i.d. N(0, σv2), independently distributed of
the cost inefficiency effects, the uft s;
(ii)
 
the uft s are non-negative random variables, which are assumed to be
independently but not identically distributed, such that uft arises from the
truncation (at zero) of the normal distribution with mean δ’zft and variance σu2,
N(δ’zft, σu2). This can also be written as uft ∼ N +(δ’zft, σu2);
(iii)
 
given the specification in model [4] for the cost inefficiency effects, the random
variable wft is defined by the truncation of the normal distribution with zero mean
and variance σu2, such that the (variable) truncation point is -δ’zft, i.e., wft  ≥ -δ’zft.
This distributional assumption on wft is consistent with the uft s being ∼ N +(δ’zft,
σu
2).
A truncated-normal distribution is a two-parameter distribution, with one
parameter, the mode (δ’zft in the case of the uft distribution), characterizing placement38
and the other (here σu2) characterizing spread. It generalizes the one-parameter half-
normal distribution, by allowing the normal distribution, which is truncated below at
zero, to have a nonzero mode. Thus the truncated-normal distribution contains an
additional parameter to be estimated (its mode), and so provides a somewhat more
flexible representation of the pattern of inefficiency in the data.
The logic underlying the Battese and Coelli model is to relax the constant-mode
property of the truncated-normal distribution specified by Stevenson (1980), by
allowing the mode to be a function of a set of explanatory variables, the zft s, that are
                                                
38 Battese and Coelli note that, unlike the Reifschneider and Stevenson (1991) model, the mode δ’zft of
the uft distribution is not required here to be non-negative for each observation, so that wft ≤ 0 is
possible in a relatively unfavorable environment (i.e., if δ’zft > 0).
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firm-specific and vary over time, and a common vector of parameters, δ39. This allows
cost inefficiency, which depends on the mode of the related truncated-normal
distribution, to depend on exogenous observable factors40.
The ML method is employed for simultaneous estimation of the parameters of the
stochastic frontier [3] and the model for the cost inefficiency effects [5]. Using the
above distributional assumptions on vft and uft, the log-likelihood function for the (T1 +
T2 + … + TF) sample observations, ln VC = (ln VC11 ,…, ln VC1T1; ln VC21 ,…, ln VC2T2;
…, ln
 VCFTF)’, can be written as
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where Φ(.) is the standard normal cumulative distribution function, 2/12 )/(' γσδ ftft zd = ,
and 2/12* ])1(/[))];,,,(ln(ln')1[( σγγβτγδγ −−+−= ftftftftftftft ZPYVCVCzd .
The log-likelihood function is formulated in terms of the parameterization
suggested by Battese and Corra (1977) who replace σv2 and σu2 with σ 2 ≡ (σv2 + σu2)
and γ
 
≡
 
σu
2/(σv2 + σu2). This is done with the calculation of the maximum likelihood in
mind. The parameter γ must lie between 0 and 1 and thus this range can be searched to
provide a suitable starting value for use in an iterative maximization process such as the
Davidon-Fletcher-Powell (DFP) routine utilized by FRONTIER Version 4.1 computer
program41. The γ-parameterization also has the advantage to provide an indication of the
relative contributions of uft and vft to ψft. As γ → 0 the symmetric noise component, vft,
                                                
39 It should be noted that if the first z-variable has value one, as in the equation [5], and the coefficients
of all other z-variables are zero, then the model reduces to the truncated-normal specification in
Stevenson (1980), with δ 0 (the only element in δ ) having the same interpretation as the µ parameter
in Stevenson. Furthermore, if all elements of the δ -vector were equal to zero, then the inefficiency
effects are not related to the z-variables and so the half-normal distribution originally specified by
Aigner et al. (1977) would be obtained.
40 The model is obviously a simplification, as it does not account for possible correlation structures of
the cost inefficiency effects and the random errors in the frontier (the uft s and the vft s are assumed to
be independently distributed for all t = 1, …, Tf, and f = 1, …, F ), nor heteroskedasticity in the uft s and
the vft s. Alternative models are required to this end (see for instance Kumbhakar et al., 1995, for a
model that introduce exogenous determinants of inefficiency with the variance of uft  which varies
across firms an over time).
41 On the contrary, the parameterization proposed in the original contribution of Aigner et al. (1977), i.e.,
σ 2 ≡ (σv2 + σu2) and λ ≡ σu/σv, makes the calculation of the maximum likelihood more difficult, since
the λ-parameter could be any non-negative value.
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dominates the one-sided cost inefficiency term, uft, in determining variation of the
global residual,
 
ψft. The inverse occurs as γ → 1. In the former case we are back to a
traditional average function model with no stochastic x-inefficiency, whereas in the
latter case we are back to a deterministic cost frontier model with no random noise
included42.
Maximization of the above log-likelihood function gives consistent and
asymptotically efficient estimators of β, δ, σ2, and γ43. It can be observed that: (i) the
failure to include uft in the frontier cost function [3], i.e., the estimation of a traditional
average response function, leads to biased and inconsistent parameter estimates,
especially if the variables specified in the cost inefficiency model [4] are not orthogonal
to those on the right hand side of the frontier cost function; (ii) the distributional
assumptions on the uft s permit the impact of Hicks neutral technological change and
time-varying behavior of the inefficiency effects to be identified, in addition to the
speed effects and the intercept parameters, β0 and δ0, in the stochastic frontier [3] and
the inefficiency model [5]44. The derivation of the log-likelihood function [6], together
with the description of the procedure implemented by FRONTIER Version 4.1 to find
its maximum and calculate the asymptotic standard errors of the ML estimators, are
presented in the Appendix45.
After obtaining estimates of the parameters, we consider the estimation of uft.
When the model in equation [4] is assumed, the overall cost inefficiency of production
for the f  th firm at the t th observation is defined by expression [7],
}'exp{}exp{ ftftftft wzuCI +== δ , [7]
which takes a value between one (when uft = 0) and infinity (when uft → ∞). The
prediction of the x-inefficiencies, CÎft, is based on conditional expectations which
generalize the estimators in Jondrow et al. (1982) and Battese and Coelli (1988). This
result is also provided in the Appendix. It is worthwhile to observe that (δ’zft + wft) >
(δ’zf’t + wf’t) for f ≠ f’ does not necessary imply that (δ’zft’ + wft’) > (δ’zf’t’ + wf’t’) for t ≠ t’.
                                                
42 The term deterministic is used because in this type of frontier models the observed cost, VCft, is
bounded below by a non-stochastic (i.e. deterministic) minimum quantity, VC(Yft, Pft, Zft, τft; β ). The
models of Aigner and Chu (1968), Afriat (1972) and Schmidt (1976) are examples of deterministic
frontiers.
43 See Aigner et al. (1977), p.28.
44 Time, τft, and average commercial speed, ln SPft, are assumed to affect both the production technology
and the cost efficiency and occur in the data set as both variables in the frontier cost function [3] and
as z-variables in the model [5] for the x-inefficiency effects.
45 The presentation follows the Appendix of Battese and Coelli (1993), excepting a few simple sign
changes to take into account that we are working with a cost frontier instead of a production frontier
model.
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Then it follows that the same ordering of firms in terms of cost inefficiency of
production does not apply to all time periods46.
4.
 
Data description
The study uses a seven-year unbalanced panel data of 45 companies operating in
the Italian LPT sector over the period from 1993 to 1999 and are members of
Federtrasporti47. More precisely, the panel includes 31 units observed in the years 1993-
1995 and 1999 and 45 units in the period 1996-1998, for a total of 259 observations48.
The sample composition by type of service is the following: of the 45 analyzed
firms, 18 mostly operate in the urban context, 15 provide extra-urban service for the
most part, and the remaining 12 have activities in both compartments. As far as the
distribution by geographical area is concerned, the sample is balanced enough: 25
operators are located in the North regions and 20 in the Center-South regions (in
particular, 10 in the Center and 10 in the South). The prevalence in the sample of
companies providing only bus service (37 units) compared to the multi-modal firms
(including also tramways, trolley-lines, and railways) reflects the modality composition
at national level, where the road mode of transportation represents about 80% of LPT
services in terms of seat-kilometers49. From the point of view of the firm size, measured
in terms of average number of employed workers, the sample includes 12 firms of large
size (more than 550 workers), 23 medium-sized units (151-550 workers), and 10 small
operators (less than 150 workers). Finally, as far as the subsidization mechanisms are
concerned, twenty-seven percent of observations (71 cases) relate to fixed-price
regulatory schemes, while seventy-three percent (188 cases) refer to transit systems
under cost-plus reimbursement rules.
For the panel construction we resorted to two different informational sources. The
starting database gathers information extracted from Federtrasporti annual reports
concerning the years indicated above. From these reports we were able to derive the
                                                
46 As it occurs, on the contrary, in the Battese and Coelli (1992) model.
47 Federtrasporti (Rome) is a nationwide trade organization member of CISPEL (Confederazione delle
Imprese di Servizi Pubblici degli Enti Locali) which associates the public-owned LPT companies and
consortia in Italy. In 2001 it merged with Fenit (Federazione Nazionale Imprese di Trasporti), a
nationwide trade organization which includes railway systems other than FS and private-owned bus
operators, and assumed the new name ASSTRA. In 1998, the companies members of Federtrasporti
was about 155, equal to 90% of the urban operators and to 50% of the extra-urban operators in Italy.
The sample we utilize in our study may then be considered sufficiently representative.
48 Work is in progress to gather cost and technical information over the years 1993-1995 and 1999 also
for the remaining 14 companies, so to have at disposal a seven-year balanced panel data, for a total of
315 observations.
49 Source: Ministero dei Trasporti e della Navigazione (1997).
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main economic and productive data for each company in the sample, such as global
production cost, labor cost, traveled kilometers, rolling stock size, average number of
workers, and fuel consumption. Data were properly integrated by further information on
cost, technical-environmental factors and type of regulatory scheme obtained through
questionnaires sent to the companies with the support of Ceris-CNR and HERMES50.
This additional investigation permitted to split the cost by productive factors other than
labor, such as capital, fuel, and materials and services. Moreover, we retrieved relevant
technical information (average load capacity and commercial speed of LPT vehicles,
network size, average fleet age), in order to complement the data extracted from the
Federtrasporti annual reports. To perform an analysis of the effects of regulatory
schemes on x-efficiency, we need information which encompasses both the
performance and the subsidization of the Italian public transit systems. To this end, in
the questionnaire we included also a question on the reimbursement mechanism adopted
by the competent local authority (Region, Province or Town Council)51. This rich
source is probably unique in Italy as a tool of comparing regulatory systems to each
other and over time.
5.
 
Empirical results
ML estimates of the parameters of the model defined in [3]-[5] are given in Tables
1a and 1b. In particular, Table 1a reports the estimated coefficients, β, for the stochastic
frontier cost function [3], while Table 1b presents the estimates of the inefficiency-
related coefficients, δ, for the model [4] and the two variance parameters, γ and σ2. The
results are given in the second column of Tables 1a and 1b, indicated by Full Model.
The third column of Tables 1a and 1b, indicated by Restricted Model, reports the ML
estimates for the parameters of the “preferred” frontier model, to be discussed below, in
which some coefficients in the general specification [3]-[5] are restricted to be zero.
                                                
50 Ceris-CNR is a division of the Italian National Research Council (CNR) which carries out economic
research on firms and growth issues. HERMES (Turin) is a research center, created in July 2000,
aimed at promoting economic research on transportation systems and other local public utilities.
51 In particular, we asked the company to specify for each observed year if the subsidization was cost-
plus (i.e., management contract) or fixed-price (i.e., net/gross cost contract) oriented. The answers
were then checked by a direct telephone talk with the operators and a discussion with the juridical
consultant of ASSTRA.
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Table 1a. Maximum-likelihood estimates for parameters of the stochastic frontier cost function [3]*
 Parameter          Full Model Restricted Model
β0 18.1137(0.0315)
18.1246
(0.0293)
βy  0.4741(0.0465)
 0.5123
(0.0152)
βk  0.1319(0.0977)
 0.0469
(0.0302)
βL  0.7873(0.1295)
 0.6917
(0.1144)
βMS  0.1460(0.0432)
 0.1549
(0.0203)
βSP -0.1805(0.0484)
-0.2352
(0.0372)
βLy  0.2785(0.1389)
 0.2321
(0.1159)
βMsy -0.0076(0.0372)
0
βLk -0.6100(0.2986)
-0.5755
(0.2503)
βMSk -0.0300(0.0750)
0
βyy -0.0524(0.0696)
0
βkk -0.3892(0.2330)
-0.2296
(0.0620)
βyk  0.1450(0.1063)
 0.0503
(0.0146)
βLMS -0.0622(0.2024)
0
βLL  1.2522(0.5990)
 1.3902
(0.4730)
βMSMS  0.2664(0.0878)
 0.1550
(0.0772)
βySP  0.1014(0.5180)
0
βkSP -0.2683(0.1016)
-0.0852
(0.0213)
βLSP -0.4193(0.1602)
-0.2910
(0.1435)
βMSP  0.3038(0.0564)
 0.2256
(0.0549)
βSPSP  0.0836(0.1226)
0
βτ -0.0157(0.0048)
-0.0137
(0.0046)
* Estimated asymptotic standard errors are given in parentheses. All the independent variables except for time have
been normalized to their sample mean value before the transformation in logarithms.
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The signs of the first-order β parameters are all as expected, with the exception of
the positive estimate for the quasi-fixed input coefficient, βk. In fact, the evidence that
the variable costs increase with larger rolling stocks is not consistent with the
microeconomic theory52. With regards to this problem, an intense debate arose in the
literature. According to Filippini (1996), the positive sign of K is due to a problem of
multicolinearity in cases where there exists a positive correlation between dependent
variable and capital indicator. The alternative argument suggested by Caves,
Christensen, Tretheway and Windle (1985) and Windle (1988) is that the positive sign
of K reflects an industry that does not minimize cost in the long term and therefore
employs too much capital in the production process. This interpretation has been later
proposed also in a study on the Italian urban transit systems carried out by Levaggi
(1994). In this work the author argues that the inefficient use of capital could derive
from the generous government programs of subsiding investments. This way of
providing funds to purchase capital distorted the input allocation.
As far as the second-order β coefficients are concerned, it can be observed that the
effects of the interaction of PMS with Y, K and PL, the interaction between Y and SP, and
the quadratic terms for Y and SP, are very weak. Indeed, the estimated parameters, βMSy,
βMSk, βLMS, βySP, βyy and βSPSP, are all small and less than their estimated standard errors,
hence asymptotic t-tests would lead to accept the null hypothesis of zero value for each
of them53.
The δ coefficients associated with the explanatory variables in the inefficiency
model [5] are of particular interest to this study. It can be seen from the second column
of Table 1b that the parameters have the right sign and are almost all statistically
significant at the 1, 5 or 10 percent level of significance. The only exception is the
estimate for the coefficient associated with the interaction between regulation dummy
and time, δRτ. This parameter assumes a negative sign, which would indicate that the
annual increase in x-inefficiency (highlighted by the positive sign of δτ) is less marked
when firms face fixed-price regulatory schemes. However, its magnitude, -0.0308, is
small compared to the estimated standard error, 0.0442, so the coefficient appears
statistically insignificant. It is worthwhile to observe that the above interaction may also
be interpreted as allowing the differential impact of regulation on cost inefficiency to
depend on time. In this case, accepting the null hypothesis of zero value for δRτ and
rejecting that it is significantly less than zero would imply that the effects of regulatory
                                                
52 This seems to be a general problem that characterizes the use of a variable cost model, not only in the
transportation industry. For a discussion on these issues see also Fabbri (1998).
53 Unless otherwise stated, all tests of hypothesis in this study are conducted at the 5% level of
significance.
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schemes are not statistically different across years, in particular the power of fixed-price
contracts to reduce inefficiency does not become stronger with the passage of time.
Table 1b. Maximum-likelihood estimates for parameters of the stochastic cost inefficiency model [5]*
 Parameter  Full Model Restricted Model
δ0  0.5881(0.3532)
 0.3546
(0.2098)
δR -0.5544(0.3751)
-0.6145
(0.2832)
δSP -0.6475(0.2786)
-0.6567
(0.1822)
δ τ  0.0511(0.0132)
 0.0303
(0.0070)
δRSP -1.0557(0.7460)
-0.8592
(0.5192)
δR τ -0.0308(0.0442)
            0
σ 2  0.0741
(0.0299)
 0.0543
(0.0167)
γ  0.9561
(0.0198)
 0.9334
(0.0263)
Log-likelihood        211.5864 205.6437
* Estimated asymptotic standard errors are given in parentheses. Variable SP has been normalized to its sample
mean value and transformed in logarithms.
The remaining two parameters in Table 1b, σ
 
2 
≡
 
(σv2 + σu2) and γ ≡ σu2/(σv2 +
σu
2), are associated with the variances of the random noise, vft, and the inefficiency
term, uft. We note, in particular, that the ML estimate for γ is 0.9561 with asymptotic
standard error of 0.0198, which indicates that the vast majority of residual variation is
due to the x-inefficiency effects and these are likely to be highly significant in the
analysis of the cost performance of the Italian LPT companies.
The hypotheses that the cost inefficiency effects are absent or that they have
simpler distributions, together with the zero-restrictions on the β and δ parameters
implied by the discussion above, have been statistically tested using the generalized
likelihood-ratio (LR) test. The LR test statistics reported in Table 2 are calculated as
)]}(ln[)]({ln[2)]}(/)({ln[2 1010 HlHlHlHl −−=−=Λ , [8]
where l(H0) and l(H1) are the values of the likelihood function under the null and
alternative hypotheses, H0 and H1, respectively. If H0 is true, this test statistic is usually
assumed to be asymptotically distributed as a chi-square (
 
χ
 
2) random variable with
degrees of freedom equal to the number of restrictions involved. However, difficulties
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arise in testing hypotheses where γ is equal to 0 because γ = 0 lies on the boundary of
the parameter space for γ, given that it cannot take negative values. In all these cases, if
H0 is true, the generalized LR statistic, Λ, has asymptotic distribution which is a mixture
of chi-square distributions whose critical values are obtained from Table 1 in Kodde and
Palm (1986)54.
Table 2. Likelihood-ratio tests of hypotheses for parameters of the stochastic frontier cost
function [3] and the cost inefficiency model [5]
Null hypothesis Log-likelihood
χ2-
statistic Decision
H0 :  γ = δ0 = δR = δSP = δτ = δRSP = δRτ = 0 179.258 64.655* Reject  H0
H0 :  γ = δ0 = δSP = δτ = 0 182.847 57.478* Reject  H0
H0 :  δRτ = 0 211.513 0.147 Accept  H0
H0 :  δRτ = βMSy = βMSk = βyy = βLMS = βySP = βSPSP = 0 205.643 11.885 Accept  H0
Restriction :  δRτ = βMSy = βMSk = βyy = βLMS = βySP = βSPSP = 0
H0 :  γ = δ0 = δR = δSP = δτ = δRSP = 0 171.718 67.849* Reject  H0
H0 :  γ = δ0 = δSP = δτ = 0 176.310 58.665* Reject  H0
H0 :  δ0 = δR = δSP = δτ = δRSP = 0 185.240 40.806 Reject  H0
H0 :  δR = δSP = δτ = δRSP = 0 192.671 25.943 Reject  H0
H0 :  δ0 = 0 201.899                           7.488 Reject  H0
* In this case the LR test statistic is asymptotically distributed as a mixture of chi-square distributions with degrees
of freedom equal to the number of parameters assumed to be equal to zero in the null hypothesis H0, provided H0
is true. The critical values for this mixed χ2-distribution are obtained from Table 1 in Kodde and Palm (1986).
It can be seen from Table 2 that the null hypothesis of absence of x-inefficiency
effects from the model  (i.e., H0: γ = δ0 = δR = δSP = δτ = δRSP = δRτ = 0) is strongly
rejected at 1 per cent level of significance55.  The second null hypothesis we consider,
H0: γ = δ0 = δSP = δτ = 0, specifies that the inefficiency effects are not stochastic.  If the
parameter γ is zero, then the variance of the uft s is zero and so the model reduces to a
traditional mean response function in which the z-variables,   Rft, (Rft × ln SPft)   and
(Rft ×τft), are included in the cost function56. Once again, the H0 hypothesis is rejected at
                                                
54 For more on the use of this test in stochastic frontier models, see Coelli (1995) and Coelli and Battese
(1996).
55 The LR test statistic, 64.655, exceeds the 1% critical value for the mixed χ 2-distribution with 7
degrees of freedom, 17.755.
56 Note that the parameters δ0, δSP and δτ must be zero if γ is zero, given that the cost function already
involves an intercept term, β0, a first-order coefficient for the speed effect, βSP, and a parameter
associated with the year of observation, βτ. If there are no random inefficiency effects in the model,
then the coefficients δ0, δSP and δτ  are not identified.
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the 1 percent level of significance57. Given the small estimate for the parameter δRτ
relative to its standard error underlined above, the third null hypothesis in Table 2
concerns the absence of significant effects on the cost inefficiency due to the interaction
between time and regulation, (Rft ×τft). As expected, H0: δRτ = 0, i.e., the hypothesis that
the marginal variation of the inefficiency term whit respect to time, ∂uft/∂τft, does not
depend on the reimbursement rule faced by the company (or, alternatively, the
differential impact of fixed-price schemes, ∂uft/∂Rft, is substantially the same across
years),
 
is accepted58. Re-estimating the model without δRτ, the estimates of the other
parameters, β and δ, were little different from those obtained for the more general
model, but the coefficients associated with the interaction of PMS with Y, K and PL, the
interaction between Y and SP, and the quadratic terms for Y and SP persisted to be small
and less than their estimated standard errors. Indeed, the LR statistic reported in Table 2
for testing the joint hypothesis H0: δRτ = βMSy = βMSk = βyy = βLMS = βySP = βSPSP = 0 is
not significant59 and so we consider that the preferred stochastic frontier model has the
seven parameters, δRτ, βMSy, βMSk, βyy, βLMS, βySP and βSPSP, constrained to be equal to
zero.
The ML estimates for the parameters of the restricted model are presented in the
third column of Tables 1a and 1b. It can be seen that all the β and δ coefficients for this
model are larger than their estimated standard errors and most of them are statistically
significant at the 1 percent level60. Table 2 reports the LR statistics for testing the null
hypotheses of absence of inefficiency effects (sixth row) and of absence of stochastic
effects (seventh row). Both values are not significant61. Similarly, the null hypotheses
that the uft s are altogether unrelated to the z-variables (eighth row), that they are not a
linear function of the subsidization mechanisms, the network commercial speed, the
year of observation and the interaction between regulation and speed (ninth row), and
that they do not include an intercept parameter (tenth row), are all also rejected at the
                                                
57 In this case the LR test statistic, 57.478, exceeds the 1% critical value for the mixed χ 2-distribution
with 4 degrees of freedom, 12.483.
58 The value of the χ 2-statistic reported in Table 2, 0.147, is less than the 1%, 5% and 10% critical values
for the χ 2-distribution with 1 degree of freedom, which are 6.634, 3.841 and 2.705, respectively.
59 The value of the χ 2-statistic, 11.885, is less than the upper 10 % point for the χ 2-distribution with 7
degrees of freedom, 12.017. Thus the null hypothesis is accepted at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels of
significance.
60 The null hypothesis of zero value is rejected at the 1% level of significance (by asymptotic t-tests)
only for the coefficient associated with the quasi-fixed input, βk , which is statistically significant at the
10% level, and for the parameters
 
βLy , βLk , βLSP and βMSMS in the frontier cost function, and the
parameters
 
δ0, δR and δRSP in the cost inefficiency model, which are all statistically significant at the
5% level.
61 In the first case, the LR test statistic, 67.849, exceeds the 1% critical value for the mixed χ 2-
distribution with 6 degrees of freedom, 16.074, while in the second case, the LR test statistic, 58.665,
exceeds the 1% critical value for the mixed χ  2-distribution with 4 degrees of freedom, 12.483.
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1% level of significance62. On the whole, these results show that the present data
support the presence of stochastic x-inefficiency effects. Furthermore, the model
specified for the inefficiency effects, involving a constant term, regulatory schemes,
network speed, year of observation and interaction between speed and regulation type,
appears to be a significant component in our stochastic cost frontier analysis of the
Italian LPT industry.
In the following Section (5.1) we will briefly take a look at the estimates of
frontier cost elasticities and the technological properties for the preferred translog
model. We postpone to Section 5.2 the discussion concerning detected x-inefficiencies
and the effects of regulatory schemes, which are our primary interest in this study.
5.1. Technical characteristics
Since all the variables (excepting time) in the cost function have been normalized
to their sample mean value, and the variable cost as well as the regressors are in natural
logarithm, the estimated first-order coefficients in the third column of Table 1a can be
usefully interpreted as frontier cost elasticities for the average operator of the
industry63. The focus of the analysis, in particular, is on the elasticities with respect to
output, βy, capital stock, βk, commercial speed, βSP, and time, βτ. These have been
utilized to infer the characteristics of technology (evaluated at the sample mean)
presented in Table 3, which highlights the separated effects on frontier costs attributable
to short-run (SRS) and long-run returns to scale (LRS), commercial speed
improvements, and Hicks neutral technological change.
The analysis, revealing the presence of short- and long-run scale economies,
validates the empirical evidence emerged in our previous study on the Italian LPT
technology. Indeed, asymptotic t-tests lead to accept both hypotheses that SRS and LRS
are significantly greater than one64. The estimated SRS, 1.95, show that, given the
endowment of quasi-fixed input, a more than proportional (almost double) output
growth could be achieved by a proportional increase in the use of all variable factors,
allowing the operator to reduce its unitary cost of production. This feature is
                                                
62 The upper 1% points for the χ 2-distribution with 5, 4 and 1 degrees of freedom are 15.086, 13.276 and
6.634, respectively.
63 The average operator (the point of normalization) corresponds to an hypothetical firm operating at an
average level of production (542,216 millions of places*traveled-kms), using an average stock of
quasi-fixed input (276 age-vehicles), and facing average variable input prices (PL = 68.3 millions
lire/workers; PMS = 13.41 lire/seat-km; PF  = 1,037 lire/litre) and average commercial speed (23.3
kms/h) over the sample.
64 Test statistics for the estimated SRS and LRS are 16.440 and 29.771, respectively. Both values are
remarkably larger than the one-sided critical value of 2.326 for the standard normal distribution at the
1 percent level of significance.
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emphasized on Figure 1, which represents the estimated average variable costs (AVC)
and marginal costs (MC) for the sample mean company in 199665 and highlights a trend
decreasing with the level of output66. So far as LRS are concerned67, the estimate, 1.86,
implies a sub-optimal scale with respect to the long-run equilibrium. On the whole,
these results highlights the existence of unused capacity and support the conjecture that
local monopoly is the relevant organization in the industry, at least for medium-sized
firms68.
Table 3. Technology characteristics evaluated at the mean of the data (average firm)*
Returns to scale
Short-run
[1/βy]
Long-run
[(1-βk)/βy]
Elasticity with respect
To commercial speed
[βSP]
Rate of Hicks neutral
technological change
[-βτ]
1.9519
(0.0579)
1.8604
(0.0289)
-0.2352
 (0.0372)
0.0137
(0.0046)
* Estimated asymptotic standard errors are given in parentheses.
The estimated frontier cost elasticity with respect to the average speed of the
network in Table 3 bears out our insights about the influence on the production process
of the specific environmental conditions characterizing the area where the service is
provided. Increasing speed of LPT vehicles by 10 percent permits to reduce the level of
operating costs for the average firm by about 2.3 percent. This result underlines the
importance of appropriate public policies concerning the local traffic regulation.
                                                
65 Year 1996 represents the average period of observation in our sample.
66 To predict the trend of AVC and MC presented in Figure 1, only the level of output has been let to
vary across the sample (from the smallest value, 33 millions of places*travelled-kms, up to 1,409,919
millions), all the other variables (input prices, capital stock and commercial speed) remaining
unchanged at the average firm values.
67 We can evaluate the long-run returns to scale by applying the algorithm first suggested by Caves et al.
(1981) and indicated in Table 3.
68 In fact, short- and long-run scale economies have been calculated at all production levels of the
sample (with the other variables fixed at the average firm values) and increasing SRS and LRS are
observed at all data points. Since the cost elasticity with respect to output does not depend on the
starting production level in the preferred frontier model (the quadratic term for output, βyy, is specified
to be zero), the value of SRS is constant throughout the sample and equal to 1.95. The estimate of LRS,
on the contrary, depends on the output through the cost elasticity with respect to capital (in which βyk
= 0.05) and decreases from 2.81 for the lowest production level (corresponding to Sondrio ASM in
1993) to 1.57 for the highest production level in the sample (corresponding to Torino ATM in 1994).
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Figure 1. Estimated average variable costs (AVC) and marginal costs (MC)
Table 3 also presents the estimated rate of Hicks neutral technological change,
i.e., the rate of cost diminution over years 1993 to 1999 (-∂
 
lnVCft /∂τft = -βτ)69. As
expected, variable costs are negatively related to the time variable: other things
remaining unchanged, the annual rate of cost reduction due to technical progress is
about 1.4 percent. This decrease in costs over time presumably reflects, to some extent,
the greater care of the road maintenance and the replacement of worn-out fleet and the
introduction of more fuel-efficient models of vehicles70, made possible by the generous
grants-in-aid government programs.
5.2. Cost inefficiency and effects of regulatory schemes
From Table 1b, we note first that the ML estimate for γ in the preferred model is
0.9334 with asymptotic standard error of 0.0263. This result is consistent with the
conclusion that the true γ-value is accepted to be greater than zero (in the LR tests
above) and the traditional average response function is not an adequate representation of
the data. However, although the vast majority of residual variation is due to the cost
                                                                                                                                              
So, the above insights can also be extended to both the small- and large-sized companies.
69 See Caves et al. (1981).
70 Between 1993 and 1996 the fuel efficiency (kilometer run per liter of fuel) of the LPT companies
included in our sample has increased on average from 2.5 to 2.8. Furthermore, the total expenditure
for spares and repairs has decreased on average from 9,919,257 lire per vehicle in 1996 to 9,765,244
lire per vehicle in 1999. This probably contributed to the cost reduction over time highlighted above.
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inefficiency effects, uft, we also see that the γ estimate is significantly less than one71, to
indicate that our stochastic frontier model [3]-[5] may be significantly different from a
deterministic frontier specification, in which there are no random errors, vft, in the cost
function.
The predicted x-inefficiencies for each one of the 45 transit companies over the
different years involved are presented in Table 4. These estimates refer to the expression
defined by equation [7] and have been obtained using the predictor presented in
equation [A.20] of the Appendix. The mean overall cost inefficiency, corresponding to
square “all firms-all years”, is found to be 1.13772. This means that, on average, the cost
of production exceeds the minimum level frontier by 13.7 percent because of x-
inefficiency. The positive coefficient for τft in Table 1b (δτ = 0.0303) suggests that the
inefficiencies of the Italian LPT firms tended to increase throughout the seven-year
period. First row of Table 4, which reports the estimates for mean cost inefficiency over
time, confirms this tendency to worsen the performance: on average, the level of x-
inefficiency has increased slightly, from 12.2 percent in 1993 to 14.2 in 1999, with an
upward swing during 1993-1995 and 1998-1999 and a brief downward swing over the
period 1996 to 199773. As mentioned in Section 3.2, one can possibly trace the
deterioration of cost efficiency during the first half of the nineties in the laxity induced
by the several actions taken by the Government with the purpose of covering the old
deficits of LPT companies through extraordinary funds. On the contrary, the temporary
efficiency recovery during 1996-1997 could be linked to expectations of more tight
financial constraints triggered by the promulgation of the reform Law n. 549 in 1995,
whereas the new rise in x-inefficiency observed in the years 1998 and 1999 probably
reflects a let-up in the managerial effort induced by the delay in implementing the
reform.
Although there is a general increase in the x-inefficiency of the transit companies
over time, Table 4 shows that the individual predicted values vary considerably among
firms in each year and they also change up and down over time for a given company.
This leads to investigate the role played by the other z-factors included in model [5]
that, jointly with time, determine such a variability in the inefficiency levels.
                                                
71 The test statistic is -2.532, that is larger (in absolute value) than the one-sided critical value of -2.326
for the standard normal distribution at the 1 percent level of significance.
72 This value is calculated as the arithmetic average of the predictors for the individual cost inefficiency
of the sample firms over all the observations involved.
73 We also computed the average annual rate of variation in the level of cost inefficiency. This is equal
to about +3%, which is consistent with the estimate for the parameter associated to the year of
observation in the inefficiency model [5],
 
δτ .
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Table 4. Estimated cost inefficiency by firm and year
Year
LPT company
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 All Years
All Firms 1.122 1.144 1.148 1.137 1.131 1.135 1.142 1.137
Firm 1 - - - 1.315 1.343 1.376 - 1.344
Firm 2 1.066 1.132 1.141 1.080 1.135 1.126 1.150 1.118
Firm 3 - - - 1.024 1.025 1.029 - 1.026
Firm 4 1.036 1.032 1.034 1.035 1.057 1.065 1.039 1.042
Firm 5 1.189 1.180 1.097 1.036 1.034 1.031 1.028 1.085
Firm 6 1.096 1.059 1.097 1.052 1.042 1.045 1.064 1.065
Firm 7 1.230 1.237 1.203 1.168 1.210 1.250 1.244 1.220
Firm 8 - - - 1.048 1.059 1.081 - 1.062
Firm 9 - - - 1.203 1.197 1.129 - 1.176
Firm 10 1.069 1.221 1.339 1.349 1.272 1.311 1.224 1.255
Firm 11 1.245 1.276 1.179 1.115 1.122 1.173 1.212 1.188
Firm 12 1.039 1.039 1.075 1.082 1.085 1.083 1.117 1.074
Firm 13 - - - 1.305 1.299 1.287 - 1.297
Firm 14 1.042 1.045 1.042 1.051 1.054 1.062 1.057 1.050
Firm 15 - - - 1.052 1.041 1.046 - 1.046
Firm 16 1.063 1.178 1.223 1.401 1.259 1.470 1.741 1.333
Firm 17 1.074 1.063 1.047 1.045 1.046 1.020 1.015 1.044
Firm 18 - - - 1.054 1.060 1.050 - 1.054
Firm 19 - - - 1.203 1.284 1.249 - 1.245
Firm 20 1.117 1.130 1.098 1.068 1.066 1.044 1.036 1.080
Firm 21 1.121 1.146 1.055 1.076 1.092 1.103 1.097 1.098
Firm 22 - - - 1.108 1.095 1.112 - 1.105
Firm 23 1.024 1.053 1.036 1.078 1.063 1.040 1.024 1.045
Firm 24 1.170 1.152 1.245 1.141 1.143 1.113 1.211 1.167
Firm 25 1.724 1.771 1.802 1.834 1.717 1.715 1.586 1.735
Firm 26 - - - 1.017 1.043 1.050 - 1.036
Firm 27 1.049 1.053 1.085 1.042 1.050 1.046 1.081 1.059
Firm 28 1.050 1.038 1.039 1.061 1.046 1.046 1.072 1.050
Firm 29 - - - 1.052 1.053 1.059 - 1.054
Firm 30 1.132 1.142 1.146 1.174 1.106 1.140 1.116 1.136
Firm 31 1.122 1.169 1.131 1.123 1.090 1.076 1.057 1.109
Firm 32 - - - 1.078 1.104 1.188 - 1.123
Firm 33 1.065 1.089 1.063 1.026 1.027 1.025 1.035 1.047
Firm 34 1.045 1.065 1.056 1.130 1.116 1.115 1.133 1.094
Firm 35 1.045 1.041 1.093 1.200 1.109 1.111 1.073 1.096
Firm 36 1.045 1.064 1.038 1.059 1.050 1.062 1.054 1.053
Firm 37 1.192 1.299 1.415 1.134 1.324 1.071 1.102 1.219
Firm 38 1.254 1.284 1.295 1.216 1.215 1.249 1.250 1.251
Firm 39 1.137 1.149 1.149 1.225 1.220 1.213 1.250 1.191
Firm 40 - - - 1.196 1.023 1.075 - 1.098
Firm 41 1.041 1.061 1.042 1.064 1.047 1.045 1.046 1.049
Firm 42 1.251 1.230 1.266 1.401 1.383 1.345 1.267 1.306
Firm 43 1.044 1.036 1.043 1.025 1.023 1.025 1.024 1.031
Firm 44 1.028 1.030 1.031 1.020 1.021 1.021 1.020 1.024
Firm 45 - - - 1.054 1.070 1.087 - 1.070
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Our primary concern, in this work, is with the differential impact of regulatory
schemes on cost efficiency. From Table 1b, the negative sign of δR (-0.6145), the
parameter related to the subsidization mechanisms as such, without their interaction
with network characteristics, seems to back our opening conjecture of lower x-
inefficiency levels for the units run under fixed-price schemes. Indeed, when compared
over time, the results of Table 4 indicate a tendency of predicted cost inefficiency to
diminish for most of companies facing a transition from cost-plus to fixed-price
reimbursement mechanisms. The differential impact of regulation is clearly observable
in many cases where the subsidization practice changed from 1996 onwards, such as,
for instance, Firm 5 (9.7 percent in 1995, 3.6 in 1996 and 3.4 percent in 1997) or Firm
43 (4.3 percent in 1995, 2.5 in 1996 and 2.3 percent in 1997). A similar evidence is
found for the transit systems which shifted from a cost-plus to a fixed-price scheme the
following year or three years later, as it occurred for Firm 41 (6.4 percent in 1996, 4.7 in
1997 and 4.5 percent in 1998), Firm 4 (6.5 percent in 1998, 3.9 percent in 1999), or
Firm 30 (14.0 percent in 1998, 11.6 percent in 1999)74.
It is worthwhile to highlight that the magnitude of the efficiency recovery differs
from case to case, and not all the firms which faced a regulatory change exhibit better
performances after the transition. This is due to the fact that the inefficiency estimates
reported in Table 4 represent the combined effect of the regulation dummy and two
other explanatory variables (besides time), viz., the average commercial speed of
vehicles, that is a proxy for network characteristics, and its interaction with the
subsidization mechanisms. Table 1b shows that an increase in the network speed tends
to lower x-inefficiency (δSP = -0.6567), as the transit company faces more favourable
exogenous operating conditions, and this effect is strongest for the units subjected to
fixed-price schemes (δRSP = -0.8592), presumably because of the higher cost reducing
effort exerted by managers under this type of regulation. As explained in Section 3.2,
from the latter result it is also proper to infer that when the intrinsic inefficiency of a
network is too high (here due to a very low commercial speed), the impact of regulatory
constraints on the overall cost efficiency becomes modest and in the extreme
circumstances is no longer perceptible (Gagnepain and Ivaldi, 1998). Thus the greater
efficiency recovery for some of the companies moved towards fixed-priced mechanisms
can be partially attributed to better network characteristics as reflected in the higher
                                                
74 Other situations of companies in which the introduction of fixed-price schemes generated a significant
fall in the level of x-inefficiency are represented by Firm 27 (8.5 percent in 1995, 4.2 in 1996 and 5.0
percent in 1997), Firm 33 (6.3 percent in 1995, 2.6 in 1996 and 2.7 percent in 1997) and Firm 44 (3.1
percent in 1995, 2.0 in 1996 and 2.1 percent in 1997), so far as the transition in 1996 is concerned, and
Firm 36 (6.2 percent in 1998, 5.4 percent in 1999) and Firm 20 (4.4 percent in 1998, 3.6 percent in
1999), as regards the transition in 1999.
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level of average commercial speed75. On the other hand, the modest effects of the
regulatory change detected for some units in the sample, or even deterioration in the
performance showed by others, is possibly imputable to worsened operating
conditions76, i.e., lower network speed, in addition to the impact exerted by time and the
exogenous shocks captured by the stochastic term wft that can have unfavorable
repercussions on cost efficiency.
So far we have focused on the differential impact of regulatory schemes over
time, by comparing predicted inefficiencies for a given LPT company before and after
the introduction of a fixed-price mechanism. To better highlight the separated effects on
cost efficiency of the regulation and network characteristics, as well as the relevance of
their mutual interaction, it may be convenient to fix the attention on cross-sectional
comparisons among firms. In fact, it is in this context that the most marked variability in
both the subsidization rules and the levels of average commercial speed is observable.
In such a way, we are also able to exploit the inefficiency estimates concerning
companies for which a time-serial match of the two types of regulation is not possible,
because of the lack of information over the period leading up the adoption of fixed-price
schemes (e.g., Firm 3, Firm 8, Firm 18).
To our end, we concentrate on the individual predicted inefficiencies pertaining to
years 1996, 1997 and 1998. We have chosen this sub-period since, excepting Firm 41,
for which a fixed-price oriented scheme is in force from 1997 only, the other 43
companies of our sample are univocally characterized by a definite regulatory
mechanism during this years. In order to leave aside time effects, we calculated a mean
inefficiency level over the period for each operator and considered the x-inefficiency
values as average realizations of a specific subsidization rule. This allows us to classify
the LPT firms on the basis of their inefficiency levels and to interpret the ensuing
ranking in terms of the different regulatory schemes and network characteristics faced
by each company. The list is presented in Table 5. Instead of reporting CÎft, we
computed the percentage increase in costs due to x-inefficiency from the expression
{CÎft -1}, so the entries in Table 5 can be directly taken as mean cost distortions over the
frontier between 1996 and 1998. They have been ranked from the best performance
(Firm 44), characterized by observed operating costs that are, on average, 2.07 percent
only above the frontier, to the worst performance (Firm 25), for which the cost
                                                
75 It is the case, for instance, of Firm 43, which reduced its level of x-inefficiency by about 42% between
1995 and 1996, or Firm 33, for which the recovery during the same period reached about 60%.
76 Firm 14 and Firm 35, for example, faced a decline in their network speed level between 1995 and
1996; while during the same period their cost inefficiency increased by about 21% and 115%,
respectively, despite the transition to fixed-price reimbursement schemes. The performance
deterioration exhibited by Firm 35 is drastic because of the already poor level of commercial speed
faced in 1995 (16.5 kms/h).
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distortion climbs to more than 70 percent. An important result emerging from Table 5 is
that 8 of the top 11 firms were subjected to fixed-price mechanisms77, whereas 9 of the
bottom 11 companies faced a cost-plus regulation78. Once again, our findings tend to
corroborate the theoretical argument about the efficacy of high powered incentive
schemes in increasing efficiency.
Table 5. Ranking of firms by mean cost distortion over the frontier (time period 1996-1998)*
LPT company Cost distortion  LPT company Cost distortion
Firm 44 0.0207 (0.000) Firm 31 0.0964 (0.024)
Firm 43 0.0243 (0.001) Firm 40 0.0978 (0.089)
Firm 3 0.0258 (0.003) Firm 22 0.1052 (0.009)
Firm 33 0.0261 (0.001) Firm 2 0.1137 (0.030)
Firm 5 0.0336 (0.002) Firm 34 0.1202 (0.008)
Firm 26 0.0367 (0.017) Firm 32 0.1232 (0.057)
Firm 17 0.0368 (0.015) Firm 24 0.1324 (0.017)
Firm 15 0.0462 (0.006) Firm 11 0.1366 (0.032)
Firm 6 0.0463 (0.005) Firm 35 0.1401 (0.052)
Firm 27 0.0492 (0.010) Firm 30 0.1401 (0.034)
Firm 28 0.0513 (0.008) Firm 9 0.1761 (0.041)
Firm 41 0.0519 (0.010) Firm 37 0.1764 (0.132)
Firm 4 0.0522 (0.015) Firm 7 0.2096 (0.041)
Firm 29 0.0545 (0.004) Firm 39 0.2195 (0.006)
Firm 18 0.0546 (0.005) Firm 38 0.2269 (0.019)
Firm 14 0.0556 (0.005) Firm 19 0.2455 (0.041)
Firm 36 0.0576 (0.006) Firm 13 0.2966 (0.009)
Firm 20 0.0594 (0.014) Firm 10 0.3105 (0.035)
Firm 23 0.0606 (0.019) Firm 1 0.3450 (0.031)
Firm 8 0.0625 (0.017) Firm 42 0.3763 (0.028)
Firm 45 0.0703 (0.016) Firm 16 0.3769 (0.108)
Firm 12 0.0836 (0.002) Firm 25 0.7555 (0.068)
Firm 21 0.0906 (0.014)
* Standard deviations are given in parentheses.
To better understand the role played by network characteristics (i.e., average
commercial speed) in the above ranking, we assigned the individual predicted
inefficiencies to four speed classes, defined in terms of brackets of average kilometers
to the hour: very low speed, SPvl ∈[13, 17.3]; low speed, SPl ∈[17.4, 23.2]; high speed,
SPh ∈[23.3, 31.4]; very high speed, SPvh ∈[31.5, 45.5]. We distinguished then operators
                                                
77 These are: Firm 44, Firm 43, Firm 3, Firm 33, Firm 5, Firm 6, Firm 27, and Firm 28.
78 These are: Firm 25, Firm 16, Firm 1, Firm 13, Firm 19, Firm 38, Firm 39, Firm 7, and Firm 37.
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subjected to cost-plus regimes, 0, from units run under fixed-price ones, 1. Finally, we
crossed the two types of categories, speed class and subsidization mechanism, and for
each of resultant groups we computed a mean cost distortion over the frontier. These
values are reported in Table 6 (shadowed square), that also presents mean cost
distortions by regulatory scheme and speed class regardless of their interaction (first
row and first column, respectively), together with the percentage decrease in x-
efficiency attainable by shifting from cost-plus to fixed-price regimes (regulation effect)
and/or by improving operating conditions of the network (speed effect).
Table 6. Mean cost distortion over the frontier by regulatory scheme and average commercial
speed class (time period 1996-1998)
Subsidization mechanism
Average commercial
speed class
All
Schemes
Cost-plus
scheme
[0]
Fixed-price
scheme
[1]
Regulation effect :
(1 – 0)/0
All speed classes* 0.1349 0.1604 0.0916 -42.89%
Very low
speed
[SPvl] 0.1791 0.2076 0.1593 -23.26%
Low
speed
[SPl] 0.1651 0.2058 0.0901 -56.22%
High
speed
[SPh] 0.0983 0.1141 0.0432 -62.14%
Very high
speed
[SPvh] 0.0692 0.1092 0.0242 -77.84%
Speed effect :
(SPl – SPvl)/SPvl -7.82% -0.87% -39.65%
(SPh – SPl)/SPl -40.46% -44.56% -52.05%
(SPvh – SPh)/SPh -29.60% -4.29% -43.98%
* Commercial speed classes have been defined in terms of brackets of average kilometers to the hour: SPvl
 
∈[13,
17.3];  SPl ∈[17.4, 23.2];  SPh ∈[23.3, 31.4];  SPvh ∈[31.5, 45.5].
First of all, the entries in Table 6 clearly confirm that both network characteristics
and regulatory constraints matter in determining x-efficiency of LPT firms: for a
company facing medium levels of commercial speed, the introduction of high powered
incentive schemes allows, on average, an efficiency recovery around 43% (first row-last
column); similarly, more favorable traffic conditions for the LPT vehicles imply lower
cost inefficiencies, with reductions which range from about 8% up to 40% according to
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the starting level of network speed, SPvl, SPl, SPh, or SPvh (first column-bottom three
rows).
Second, it emerges a general tendency of the regulation effect to become stronger
as we move towards higher speed classes; on the other hand, the average efficiency gain
that can be realized by making mobility more flowing are always greater in case of
fixed-price regimes, given the higher effort level exerted by managers in the allocation
of productive resources. In particular, two opposite groups of operators (the ones more
shadowed in the square of Table 6) are worth to be highlighted: in the first one, which
includes units characterized by very high levels of network speed, the favorable
operating conditions combined with fixed-price regulations leads to remarkable
inefficiency decrease, on average around 78% (from 10.92 to 2.42 percent); in the
second group, gathering very slow speed networks, since the exogenous technical
efficiency is likely to be rather low, the more intensive effort activity provided by
managers in case of fixed-price schemes has a moderate effect on the x-inefficiency
(-23%) and the global cost distortions over the frontier remain heavy, on average about
16 percent.
These results can help explain the ranking of companies presented in Table 5
above. It should be more clear why the top four positions are held by companies facing
very high levels of commercial speed combined with incentive subsidization
mechanisms, while at the bottom of the list one observes mainly firms under cost-plus
regulation with a very slow network speed. At the same time, we are also able to
account for both the presence of companies subjected to cost-plus subsidization among
the top ten performances, due to the favorable characteristics of their network79, and the
positioning of operators constrained by fixed-price schemes among the worst ten
positions, because of the very low levels of their commercial speed80.
6.
 
Conclusion and policy implications
On the whole, the results of this exploratory study indicate a significant impact of
regulatory constraints on the cost efficiency of the Italian LPT companies. First, the fact
that fixed-price schemes provide more incentives for efficiency is validated: given
similar network characteristics, operators run under a fixed-price mechanism have a
lower cost distortion than operators subjected to a cost-plus regulation. Moreover, to
                                                
79 It is the case, for instance, of operators such as Firm 26 or Firm 17, which face average commercial
speeds equal to around 45 and 27 kms/h, respectively.
80 In this situation, we find Firm 10 (16 kms/h) and Firm 48 (15 kms/h).
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some extent the inefficiency differentials among companies can be due to differences in
the commercial speed levels. These latter contribute to determine what Gagnepain &
Ivaldi (1998) called intrinsic inefficiency of a network and can seriously undermine the
efficacy of incentive regulatory policies. In view of the evidence found for the operators
facing very low commercial speed levels, if the exogenous operating conditions become
too unfavorable, then fixed-price subsidization mechanisms are less successful
instruments for recovering efficiency.
These findings provide useful guidelines for the policy interventions concerning
local mobility. Significant reductions of x-inefficiency can be achieved by introducing
fixed-price schemes of subsidization, and the ongoing reform correctly moves towards
this direction. A proper definition of quality and cost standards is requested, so that the
service contract between local authority and LPT operator gives the manager the
incentives to optimize the allocation of productive resources. Our results also underline
the impact of network characteristics and confirm the importance of local traffic
regulation, already stressed by Fraquelli et al. (2001b). In fact, a more flowing mobility
for LPT vehicles would have positive effects on both the technology (higher
commercial speeds lower the minimum-cost frontier) and the x-efficiency levels (higher
commercial speeds move firm performances closer to the best-practice behavior). This
could be pursued, for instance, by acting on factors such as the re-allocation of existing
road space away from private vehicles towards public passenger transport (e.g., reserved
lanes for trams and buses, restrictions on parking and traffic of cars and taxis), or the
provision of incentives for the use of public modes (e.g., good intra- and inter-modal
timetable coordination, introduction of multi-modal travelcards).
In conclusion, there is a scope for transport policy to increase cost efficiency of
Italian LPT companies. Efforts have to be intensified in the twofold direction of
replacing cost-plus subsidization mechanisms with high-powered incentive schemes as
well as improving exogenous operating conditions of the network. Indeed, a peculiarity
of our study is to highlight the complementarity between the effects exerted by these
two instruments. Local authorities will have to define the proper mix of interventions
according to the specific regulatory framework and environmental factors faced by
single LPT firms.
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Appendix
The log-likelihood function presented in the Appendix of the Battese and Coelli
(1993) working paper refers to a stochastic frontier production function, with the uft s
interpreted as pure technical inefficiency effects, which cause the firm to operate below
the production frontier. If we wish to specify a stochastic frontier cost function, we have
to alter the global error term specification from ψft = (vft - uft), as in Battese and Coelli
(1993), to ψft = (vft + uft), as in the equation [2] reported in the text81. The uft s now
define how far the firm operates above the cost frontier and involve both technical and
allocative inefficiencies. The log-likelihood function for the cost frontier specification
analogue of the Battese and Coelli model can be obtained by making a few simple sign
changes and is reproduced here.
For simplicity of presentation of results in this Appendix, we assume that the
stochastic frontier cost model [1]-[2] is expressed by
ftftft xvcvc ψβ += );(        [A.1]
ftftft uv +=ψ [A.2]
f = 1, …, F,   and   t = 1, …, Tf , 
where (.)ln(.),ln VCvcVCvc ftft ==   and xft is a vector which groups the arguments of
the variable cost function, Yft, Pft, Zft, and τft; further, vft ∼ i.i.d. N(0, σv2) and uft ∼ N
+(δ’zft, σu2).
The density functions for vft and uft are
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where the subscripts, f and t, are omitted for convenience in the presentation; and Φ[.] is
the standard normal cumulative distribution function.
                                                
81 The inefficiency effect, uft, is added in the stochastic cost frontier instead of being subtracted, as in the
case of the stochastic production frontier, because the cost function represents minimum cost, whereas
the production function represents maximum output.
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Given the independence assumption, the joint density function for u and v is the
product of their individual density functions, and so
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since ψ = v + u, the joint density function for ψ and u is
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Thus the marginal density function for ψ = v + u is obtained by integrating u out
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or, alternatively,
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The density function for the cost value, vcft, in equation [A.1], is most
conveniently given using the expression in equation [A.9b],
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Given that there are Tf observations obtained for the f th firm, where 1 ≤ Tf ≤ T, and
vcf  ≡ )',...,,( 21 ffTff vcvcvc denotes the vector of the Tf cost values in equation [A.1], then
the logarithm of the likelihood function for the sample observations, vc 
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where Θ* ≡ (β ’, δ ’, σu2, σv2)’.
Using the re-parameterization of the model suggested by Battese and Corra
(1977), involving the parameters σ
 
2
 ≡ (σv2 + σu2) and 0 ≤ γ ≡ σu2/(σv2 + σu2) ≤ 1, the
logarithm of the likelihood function can be expressed by
{ }2
1
ln2ln
2
1);( σπ +



−=Θ ∑
=
 TvcL
F
f
f
{ }∑∑
= =
−−−
F
f
T
t
ftftft
f
zxvcvc 
1 1
22 /]');([
2
1
σδβ
{ }∑∑
= =
Φ−Φ−
F
f
T
t
ftft
f
dd 
1 1
* ][ln][ln
2
1
, [A.12]
Ceris-Cnr, W.P. N° 2/2002
44
where  2/12 )/(' γσδ ftft zd = ,   [A.13]
2/12** ])1(/[ σγγµ −= ftftd ,    [A.14]
));((')1(* βγδγµ ftftftft xvcvcz −+−= , [A.15]
2/12
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])1([ σγγσ −= ,     [A.16]
and                      Θ ≡ (β ’, δ ’, σ 2, γ)’.
The log-likelihood function in equation [A.12] can be maximized with respect to
each element of Θ to obtain maximum likelihood (ML) estimates of all parameters, β, δ,
σ
 
2
 and γ.
The computer program, FRONTIER Version 4.1, is used in this study to obtain
the ML estimates for the parameters of the stochastic frontier cost model defined by
equations [3]-[5] in the text. This program uses a three-step estimation procedure:
1.
 
The first step involves calculation of the OLS estimators of β and σ2.
2.
 
In the second step, a grid search is conducted across the parameter space of γ, i.e.,
the log-likelihood function is evaluated for values of γ from 0.1 to 0.9 in
increments of size 0.1. In these calculations, the β parameters (excepting β0) are
set to the OLS values, whit β0 and σ2 adjusted according to the corrected ordinary
least squares formula presented in Coelli (1995). Any other parameters (δ -vector
in our case) are set to zero during this grid search.
3.
 
The final step uses the best estimates (that is, those corresponding to the largest
log-likelihood value) from the second step as starting values in a Davidon-
Fletcher-Powell (DFP) iterative maximization algorithm which obtain the final
ML estimates when the likelihood function attains its global maximum.
Approximate standard errors of the ML estimators are then calculated by
obtaining the square roots of the diagonal elements of the direction matrix from the final
iteration of the DFP routine82.
Once the ML estimates for the parameters of the stochastic frontier cost model
have been obtained, predictions of the cost inefficiency for each producer, f, at each
observation, t, have to be derived. We have estimates of ψft = vft + uft and we must
extract the information that ψft contains on the unobservable component uft. According
to the original insight of Jondrow et al. (1982), a solution to the problem is obtained
                                                
82 The direction matrix for the final iteration is usually a good approximation for the inverse of the
Hessian of the log-likelihood function, unless the DFP routine terminates after only a few iterations.
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from the conditional distribution of uft given ψft, which incorporates whatever
information ψft contains concerning uft.
The conditional density function of uft given Ψft = ψft is given by83
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thus, using equations [A.6B] and [A.9b],
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The overall cost efficiency of the f th firm at the tth observation, CEft, may be
expressed as the ratio of stochastic frontier minimum cost (with uft = 0) to observed
cost, which is equal to84
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This measure is bounded between zero (uft → ∞) and one (uft = 0), and can be
predicted in a similar way to that described for technical efficiency in the stochastic
production frontier case analyzed by Battese and Coelli (1993). Using the conditional
distribution of uft given ψft defined by equation [A.17], the authors derive an expression
for the conditional expectation of the technical efficiency for the f th firm at the tth
observation, conditional upon the observed value of ψft = (vft - uft). This expression,
E(exp{-uf}|Ψft = ψft), is a generalization of the results presented in Jondrow et al. (1982)
and Battese and Coelli (1988).
The prediction of the individual cost efficiencies relative to a stochastic cost
frontier, i.e. expression [A.19], can be obtained by minor sign alterations of the
technical efficiency point estimator in Battese and Coelli (1993). It is derived using the
conditional density function of uft given Ψft = ψft specified in equation [A.18] and is
given by
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83 Again the subscripts, f and t, are omitted in the following expressions for convenience in the
presentation.
84 Expression [A.19] is appropriate for CEft only if the general specification of the stochastic frontier
cost model is given by equations [1]-[2] in the text.
Ceris-Cnr, W.P. N° 2/2002
46
where *ftµ  and *σ  are defined by expressions [A.15] and [A.16].
Starting from the estimated stochastic cost frontier, FRONTIER Version 4.1
returns an estimate of cost inefficiency for each producer at each observation, i.e. a
prediction of CIft = exp{uft}. It measures the extent to which observed costs exceed the
corresponding stochastic frontier values and it is then calculated as the inverse of CEft in
equation [A.19], this last being predicted by applying the point estimator specified in
equation [A.20].
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